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The extraordinary success of Grillo and the elec-
toral collapse of the PdL and the PD deeply trans-
formed the landscape of the Italian party system. 
A “limited bipolar” party system emerged after 
the 2008 general elections, with two parties, PdL 
and PD, collectively getting more than 70% of the 
votes [Chiaramonte 2010]. This represented a great 
innovation with respect to the “fragmented bipo-
lar” system that had characterized the recent years, 
a system in which many small parties could exert 
considerable power upon the two main political 
coalitions. Additionally, this represents an innova-
tion with respect to the First Republic, in which the 
competitive dynamic between the two main par-
ties (the PCI and the DC) played on strong ideo-
logical polarization and an international context 
that hindered any sort of alternation.
The Italian party system has once again changed 
its nature with the most recent election. A party un-
dergoing its first electoral test was able to achieve 
25.6% of the vote, a truly unique event in Western 
European history (excluding the foundation of 
democratic regimes). Even the unprecedented suc-
cess of FI in 1994 (21%) was exceeded. Moreover, for 
the first time, three parties each received more than 
20% of the vote, thus transforming the Italian po-
litical system from a bipolar system, which charac-
terized the Second Republic, into a tripolar system. 
The index of bipolarism (Figure 1) is the sum of 
the vote shares (or seats) received by the two main 
coalitions. As it appears in the figure, the two curves 
register a true breakdown. The total votes assigned 
to the two largest coalitions had grown through-
out the Second Republic, reaching its peak in 2006 
(99.1%), in an election characterized by a perfectly 
bipolar competition. Then in 2008 the, bipolar na-
ture of the system lost some strength (84.4%); how-
ever, it remained at about the same level from 1994 
to 2001. Today, it registers a breakdown of almost 
26 points, as only 58.7% of the votes were won by 
the two main political options, and more than 40% 
of voters betrayed the classic bipolar dynamic of the 
election. The same trend can be observed through 
the variation in seats, although in a less striking 
way due to the disproportional mechanism of the 
electoral law that favors the main political options. 
Today, one-fourth of the seats in the Chamber are 
assigned to the representatives of the third (and the 
fourth) pole. 
The sizable drop in the two-party index, which 
measures the shares of votes and seats collected 
by the two main electoral lists, is an obvious con-
sequence of a system where three parties surpass 
more than 20% of the votes. Today, the index has 
dropped to 51%, from 70.6% in 2008 (represent-
ing the peak since 1979). This share is greater than 
those encountered during the Second Republic 
(figure 2) but still is not comparable to the num-
bers seen in other Western democracies. Today, ap-
proximately half of the voters do not vote for either 
of the two main parties.
If we widen our analysis beyond the three main 
political options, we observe the reappearance of 
small parties in the 2013 elections. In fact, 10 lists 
received 1% of the vote, the same number repre-
sented in the Parliament. These lists, however, are 
not the same: RC (2.2%) and FiD (1.1%) will not 
enter into the Parliament, while the CD, led by 
Tabacci, and the South Tyroleans of the SVP had 
access to seats despite having only 0.5% and 0.4%, 
respectively, of the votes. 
These numbers signal an inversion with respect 
to the tendencies registered in 2008, when there 
were nine parties receiving over 1% of the votes, 
but only six of their lists were represented in Par-
liament. The political choices of party leaders had 
produced a drastic reduction of the fragmentation 
compared with the previous election. Today, even 
though the same electoral system is in place, differ-
ent choices have generated an increasing number of 
political parties. The effective number of electoral 
lists (namely, the Laasko-Taagepera index [1979]) 
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provides a synthetic measure of the number of 
parties competing in the electoral arena (in terms 
of votes) or in Parliament (seats). It is an effective 
way to count parties while highlighting their ac-
tual electoral strength. For instance, in the case of 
a perfect two-party system, if the two electoral lists 
each receive 50% of the votes, then the index has 
a value of 2. As it appears in figure 4, the number 
of effective parties in 2013 has increased to 5.3% 
from 3.8% in 2008, closer to the 2006 value of 5.7%. 
As for the number of effective parties in the Parlia-
ment, it has increased only slightly compared with 
2008, remaining at 3.5%.
The complex and sometimes contradictory dy-
namics in the Italian electoral system is very re-
strictive for the parties outside of political coali-
tions (the representation threshold in the Chamber 
is 4%), but quite open for those within a coalition 
(2% with an admission clause for the first-place 
finisher under the threshold). This can essentially 
explain the difference in the fragmentation be-
tween the electoral and the parliamentary arenas. 
In fact, this system, which allows parliamentary 
representation of up to 10 parties, produced the 
highest disproportionality of our republic’s histo-
ry in the conversion between votes and seats (fig-
ure 5). This disproportionality can be measured 
through the Gallagher Index (1991), which exam-
ines the difference between the votes and seats at-
tributed to the various political parties: the greater 
this difference is, the greater the bias induced by 
the electoral system and therefore the higher the 
Gallagher Index. 
As it appears, the index retained extremely low 
levels throughout the First Republic (1948–1992) 
due to the almost purely proportional electoral law. 
Figure 1. Index of bipolarism (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013).
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Note: The index of bipolarism is the sum of the votes (or seats) of the two strongest coalitions. In particular, in the 
elections between 1994 and 2001, it is the joint percentage of the majoritarian/uninominal votes of the “en-
larged” coalitions (including eventual territorial differences and partial alliances) of the center-right and center-
left. For the 2006 and 2008 elections, it represents the joint percentage of the proportional votes of the two 
strongest coalitions (as defined by the same coalition leader).
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The introduction of the 4% representation thresh-
old for all the electoral lists in 1994 produced an in-
crease in the index, which reached its maximum in 
2001 (10.2). With the introduction of the Porcellum 
electoral law, the system became more proportion-
al again as the two main political coalitions tried to 
ensure representation of the smaller lists, enabling 
them to avoid the 4% threshold. Today, the Dispro-
portionality Index has shot up to 17.3, more than 
three times the 2008 value. This was made possible 
by the fact that the winning coalition has received 
54%, with only 29.5% of the votes. On the contra-
ry, in the 2006 elections, the center-left coalition 
(L’Unione) had a majority in the Chamber with 
49.8%, while the PdL and the LN received 46.8% 
of the votes. This bias in the representation mecha-
nism ranked Italy second in Western Europe, just 
below France (17.7) and ahead of the UK (15.1) in 
2010. Notwithstanding, both France and the UK 
have majoritarian electoral systems, while Italy has 
a (formally) proportional one. 
There are no doubts that the 2013 elections has 
created a turning point, bringing with it the crisis of 
the two-party system, an increase in fragmentation, 
and disproportionality at an all-time high. De-
spite these, the evidence indicates that the greatest 
change is not one of the previous; rather, it is the in-
dex of aggregate volatility. This index simply meas-
ures the net aggregate switch in votes between two 
successive elections [Pedersen 1979; Bartolini 1986], 
and it is calculated by summing up the differences 
in terms of votes shares among parties between an 
election and the previous one. Volatility is therefore 
a measure of stability for a political system. 
In 2013, Italian volatility reached an incred-
ible value of 39.1 (the index ranges between 0 and 
100), more than four times the value registered in 
2008. Mair (2011) indicates that a highly volatile 
election is one scoring higher than 20, making the 
value of 39.1 very significant. Looking at a sample 
of 279 elections in 16 countries since WWII, only 
the dramatic Greek elections of May 2012 and the 
Figure 2. Two-party index (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013)
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Note: The two-party index represents the sum of the votes (or seats) cast for the two biggest electoral lists. In 
2006, DS and DL were considered separately instead of a unitary list of the center-left (Ulivo).
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Spanish elections in 1982 have shown a greater 
volatility than that of Italy in 2013. These numbers 
provide an idea of the historical extent of the ongo-
ing realignment of party system changes that seem 
to change with each election. In 1994, the index 
scored an analogous peak (Figure 6) and that elec-
tion was characterized by the fall of the old par-
ties (primarily the DC) and the rise of new ones 
(FI being the main one). In that moment, the First 
Republic was brought to a close, and the Second 
Republic was born. Only time will tell if the 2013 
elections will be the catalyst for the birth of the 
Third Republic.
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Figure 4. Number of effective electoral lists (Chamber of Deputies, 2006–2013)
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Note: The effective number of electoral lists in terms of votes was calculated taking into account the votes from 
the proportional component of the electoral representation. For the 2006 elections, the two separate lists for 
the DS and the DL (center-left Christian-democrats), rather than the joint list of the Ulivo, have been used. We 
obtained this data by interpolating the relative strength of the two lists at the Senate (where they were divided). 
In 2008, both PD and PdL were considered as unique lists since the PdL’s constitutive parties would have merged 
only a few months after, even though they were still officially split. As for the effective number of electoral lists 
in terms of seats, for the elections between 1994 and 2001, it was calculated taking into account, separately, 
all the parties that received at least one seat in the proportional component (either with their own list or with an 
associated one) or in the majoritarian one (either on their own or in coalition with other political parties). Analo-
gously, we have taken into account all the parties’ seats irrespectively from the fact that they were assigned to 
their own lists, to associated lists, or as “guests” on other lists. 
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Figure 5. Disproportionality Index (Chamber of Deputies, 1948–2013)
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Note: The index was calculated with only the proportional component for the elections held in 1994, 1996, and 
2001.
Figure 6. Total volatility (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013)
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